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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
STEVEN J. KEARL,
Defendant-Appellant.

NOS. 44565 & 44566
Bonner County Case Nos.
CR-2016-365 & 2016-1410

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Kearl failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
imposing concurrent unified sentences of 13 years, with three years fixed, upon his
guilty plea to lewd conduct with child under 16, and 10 years, with three years fixed,
upon his guilty plea to possession of sexually exploitative material?

Kearl Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
Kearl pled guilty to lewd conduct with child under 16 (44565) and to possession
of sexually exploitative material (44566).

(R., pp.96-99, 226-29)

The district court

imposed concurrent unified sentences of 13 years, with three years fixed (44565), and

1

10 years, with three years fixed (44566). (R., pp.96-99, 226-29.) Kearl filed a timely
notice of appeal in each case. (R., pp.101-03, 231-33.)
Kearl asserts his underlying sentence is excessive in light of his lack of criminal
history, employment history, need for alcohol and sex offender treatment, and his
purported remorse and acceptance of responsibility. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.) The
record supports the sentence imposed.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire
length of the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160
Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d
217, 226 (2008). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the
defendant's probable term of confinement. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170
P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears
the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. McIntosh, 160 Idaho
at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant must show
the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or
retribution. Id. The district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give
them differing weights when deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629;
State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that the objectives of punishment, deterrence and protection of
society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In deference to the trial judge, this
Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds
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might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens, 146 Idaho at
148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the
trial court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
The maximum prison sentence for lewd conduct with child under 16 is life and for
possession of sexually exploitative material is up to 10 years.

I.C. §§ 18-1508,

-1507(3). The district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of 13 years, with
three years fixed, for lewd conduct with child under 16, and 10 years, with three years
fixed, for possession of sexually exploitative material, both of which fall within the
statutory guidelines. (R., pp. 96-99, 226-29.)
Kearl’s claim that he has “no criminal history of any kind” (Appellant’s brief, p. 3
(citing Tr., p.9, Ls.6-10)) is not entirely accurate. While he has no prior convictions, it is
undisputed that he sexually abused his daughter over a period of 10 years before she
disclosed the molestation, thereby giving rise to the lewd conduct charge to which Kearl
pled guilty in this case. (PSI for CR-2016-1410, p.6.) In any event, the district court
specifically considered Kearl’s “lack of prior criminal history” as a mitigating factor in its
sentencing determination. (Sent. Tr., p.16, Ls.9-12.) The court was also well aware at
the time of sentencing that Kearl expressed a desire for treatment, was remorseful and
had a positive employment history. (See PSI for CR-2016-1410, pp.7, 11-13; Sent. Tr.,
p.9, L.11 – p.10, L.8, p.13, L.22 – p.14, L.1, p.14, L.16 – p.15, L.9.) That the court
ultimately concluded none of these factors outweighed the need for a sentence that
would achieve societal protection, deterrence, and punishment does not show the court
abused its discretion. At sentencing, the district court addressed the seriousness of the

3

offenses and the devastating impact Kearl’s actions had on the victim. (Sent. Tr., p.15,
L.22 – p.18, L.2 (Appendix A).) The state submits that Kearl has failed to establish an
abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the
sentencing hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal.
(Appendix A.)

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Kearl’s convictions and
sentences.

DATED this 18th day of July, 2017.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA HYMAS
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 18th day of July, 2017, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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APPENDIX A

15

Recovery for Tiffany and myself is

1
2

predicated on the fact that we can overcome our

3

adversiti es through treatment and s upport with

4

understanding , that we are redeemable and sti l l of

5

value .
I have always been a person of few words .

6
7

I would ask the Court for the chance to let my

8

actions spea k fervently and loudly , that I am an

9

amenab l e candidate for change.

10

THE COURT :

11

For the record, any legal , factual or

12

Thank you, Mr. Kearl.

ethical reason not to impose the sentence?
MS . JENSEN :

13

No, Your Honor .

We would ask

14

the Court in all the factual instances, I guess,

15

underlying t his case just with his legal history , he

16

would qualify for a withheld judgment; and certainly

17

as k the Court to take that into consideration as

18

well.

19
20

But no other e q uitable reasons to avoid
sentencing , Your Honor.

21

THE COURT :

22

Mr. Kea rl , there are four things that I ' m

23

24
25

Thank you .

directed by statute to l ook at when I sentence.
Number one is protection of society.
Number two is to deter you and other people from

1

16

l

committing crimes like this .

2

rehabilitation.

3

punish~ent .

4

Number three is

Number four is retri bution or

And I need to look at the nature of the

5

offense, the aggravating and the mitigating factors ,

6

the impact on the victim, the nature of your

7

credibi l i t y , remorse, attitude , alcoho l and drug use .

8

And I have looked at all of those factors.

9

Mitigating factors are lack of prior

10

criminal history, the low LSI score.

11

don't know how to say it except t hat sex offenses are

12

different.

13

However , I

I have sentenced a number of people o n lewd

14

and lascivious cases .

15

prior criminal histor y and a low LS I score .

16

offenses , especially when they are within a family,

17

they are hidden offenses.

18

And the vast majority have no
Sex

And typicall y sex offenders don ' t commit

19

other crimes and they go unnoticed .

And that's kind

20

of the tragedy, that something like this can go on

21

for years and years and without -- until it ' s finally

22

discovered .

23

In this case , this isn't l ike a crime where

24

a person gets caught early or confesses or anyt hi ng .

25

Finally , the victim gets old enough and feels strong

2

17

1

enough and safe enough , had some therapy, and then

2

the victim is able to disclos e .
I can't think of any other crime, except for

3

4

a murder, that takes so much f~om a victim.

And

5

like Tiffany said in this case , when you take a

6

person ' s trust and thei r innocence in childhood , you

7

know

8

protect their children .

9

something like this happens -- just your basic

that a father is the person that's supposed to
So , that's something -- when

10

foundation of the way life is supposed to work and

11

who you can trust is completely shaken.
And I have a lot of respect for Mr. Lombard

12
13

as we ll , a nd I agree wi th Ms . Jensen that he has no

14

hesitation in recommending prison .

15

reta ined juri sdiction in thi s case jus t does not

16

deal with the seriousness of the crime , the

17

deterrent, the retribution , the protection factors .

But I think a

18

So, I try to find a sentence that I believe

19

marries your lower risks with the seriousness of the

20

crime.

21

13 years , three years fixed, 10 years indeterminate.

22

I am going to require that you spend som~ Lime in

23

prison .

24
25

So I am going to impose a unified sentence of

The crime i s j ust too serious for you not to
do that .

I t hink for yourself, taking

3

18

1

responsibility, real i z i ng the fact you do that for

2

your family and for the community.

j

I will make the sentences on the two cases

4

concurrent .

5

sexual exploitation, is a ten year.

6

7
8

9

10
11

12
13

I think the sentence is l i mited on

So , a three and ten on the Land L c ase,
three and seven on the sexual exploitation case.
The sentences are concurrent .

You will get

credit for a ll the t ime you have served to date .

I

will impose court costs in each case .
Given the length of the sentence , I won ' t
impose fines .
There may be a request - - Mr. Marshal l , I

14

don ' t know if there wi ll be any request for

15

restitution or not .

16

MR . MARSHALL :

17

THE COURT :

Probably not , Your Honor .

Mr . Kearl has been in custody

18

well -- I note t he probabl e cause was found on

19

January 17 o f 2016 .

20

be li eve that is the t est imony tha t since that time --

21

I know he was in the hospi t al for a short period of

22

time , I believe.

23

24
25

MS. JENSEN :

So , Mr. Kearl , Ms . J ensen , I do

Mr . Kearl believes he was taken

into custody on the 15th .
THE COURT:

All right , I will g i ve you

4

